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Abstract
Data privacy is a topic of interest for researchers,
data collection managers, and data system specialists.
To assuage growing concerns regarding the collection
and use of personal data, many organizations have
begun developing systems and drafting policies meant
to safeguard that data from potential privacy harms.
This paper provides a surface-level comparison of
data privacy triads from NIST in the United States and
ULD in Germany that may form the basis for a future
universal definition of data privacy. The analysis
shows two different approaches for defining data
privacy: one which focuses on the practical
implementation of data privacy safeguards (NIST) and
one that focuses on defining the highest possible
standards to which data processors must be held
(ULD).

1. Introduction
In January of this year, security experts discovered a
massive security breach: a collection of 772 million
unique emails and 21 million unique passwords [1].
These types of massive breaches are occurring more
frequently, resulting in increased public and industry
pressure to safeguard the privacy of users. While there
are established standards related to security, privacy
controls in the U.S. are still under development.
One thing holding back privacy is that a generally
accepted and well-formed definition of data privacy
(and, thus, that which must be protected) has not yet
been developed. The purpose of this paper is to analyze
two potential ontological definitions for data privacy
while also providing recommendations to produce
stronger definitions in the future. Without an agreed-to
definition, how can data privacy standards, tools, and
solutions be developed? Would a vendor-developed
tool be missing an important component of data
privacy? Would privacy assessors and auditors have
incomplete standards from which to model after?
Information security is commonly understood to be
made up of confidentiality, integrity and availability.
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This shared understanding of the definition of security
allows vendors to build tools that can be consistently
utilized by all organizations, regardless of culture,
nationality, size and mission. Since data privacy
currently lacks a standard definition, vendors run the
risk of developing privacy standards, frameworks,
checklists and tools which are fundamentally
incomplete, ineffectual, or even harmful to the
organizations that use them. This concern of continuing
with a fractured understanding of data privacy begs the
question of what actions standard-setting bodies have
taken when it comes to formally defining the issue.
Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz
Schleswig-Holstein (ULD) is a data protection
authority based in Kiel, Germany that advises data
processors on data privacy-related issues. In 2015, the
ULD published “Protection Goals for Privacy
Engineering” as part of the IEEE CS Security and
Privacy Workshops. In this report, the ULD defines six
protection goals organized as a set of three axes. These
three axes form their so-called Six-Pointed Star and
form the basis of their ontology [43].
The National Institute of Standards and Technology
is a United States Department of Commerce institute
that supports American scientific innovation and
industrial competitivity. In NIST Internal Report 8062,
NIST introduced a data privacy framework to assist in
the development of systems that better protect the
privacy of those whose data is collected, stored, and
retained in those systems. This document first appeared
as a draft in January of 2015 before being published in
April of 2017 with the intent to “establish the basis for
a common vocabulary to facilitate better understanding
and communication of privacy risk within federal
systems, and the effective implementation of privacy
principles” [2].
The remainder of this paper is as follows: section 2
contains a literature review regarding current data
security and data privacy issues, section 3 details
background information regarding the two frameworks
being compared, section 4 contains the actual
comparison and analysis of the ontologies, section 5
contains the conclusions reached as a result of the
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comparison, and section 6 contains recommendations
for future research regarding this topic.

2. Literature Review
Data breaches affected more than one billion people
in 2018 [3]. In fact, reports demonstrate that data
breaches of electronic health records are occurring on
an unprecedented scale with half of the US population
compromised [4]. Many annual data security studies
exist examining the cybersecurity field [5-10]. Data
breaches continue, and hackers consider data security
big business.
Privacy breaches are also on the rise with data
privacy becoming big business for hackers [11, 12].
Unfortunately, the Internet of Things (IoT) promises to
magnify the number of privacy breaches [13]. With an
ever-interconnected world, data privacy is an
international issue [14-16]. Cambridge Analytica went
into bankruptcy protection after their data handling
practices came to light [17, 18]. Like the path of data
security, the path of data privacy is being spearheaded
by scandals, breaches, and international concern.
Consequently, data privacy is becoming a hot topic
in business today [19-21]. At the U.S. federal level,
NIST has created several “Security and Privacy”
publications that address privacy assessments, privacy
frameworks, and tips for privatizing technical
environments [22-25]. Facebook has announced an
enormous restructuring [26] and a change in strategy
putting privacy at the center of their strategy [27]. But
a simple question exists: what is data privacy? What
constitutes data privacy? The world is creating privacy
methods and tools to protect privacy [28], working to
integrate privacy and technology [29], and has
outlined key activities which must occur to keep a
digital investigation private [30]. Diversity studies are
completed to understand demographics behind good
and poor privacy [31]. However, the reality is that the
world pushed ahead with creating a plethora of
privacy frameworks, tools, and solutions before it
developed a universal understanding of what data
privacy is [32, 33].
When it comes to privacy, however, most of the
research done has been based on defining it in a legal
or philosophic sense and, while these definitions are
powerful, they do not define data privacy in the way
the CIA triad defines data security [34]; [35]; [36];
[37]. A great deal of research and development has
been conducted to define data security. From these
efforts came a fairly universal understanding and the
development of the CIA Triad [38]. The CIA triad
highlights confidentiality, integrity and availability as
the three primary goals of data security [39]. Because

of this agreed-to definition, lawmakers, security
professionals and policymakers all understand that
data security is comprised of confidentiality, integrity
and availability. Vendors can create solutions which
address all three important goals.
While data security has much work to keep ahead
of the bad guys, the definition is firm, and solutions
can be developed and operationalized. When new
technologies emerge (such as machine learning and
artificial intelligence), these technologies can be
targeted to all the characteristics of a triad (in the case
of data security to the confidentiality, integrity and
availability characteristics).
Data privacy does not have an agreed-to definition,
so organizations run the risk of incomplete data
privacy. Data privacy is considered a thornier issue
than data security [40]; consequently, many
policymakers simply avoid defining data privacy [33].
Many are putting their heads in the sand, but during a
crisis, privacy and personal integrity issues can
sometimes be overlooked [41]. Similar to data
security, data privacy must be baked into
organizational business processes [42]. As such, NIST
has developed a series of publications to assist
decision-makers and implementors with privacy
processes and safeguards [22-25]. With no shared
agreement of the key aspects that must be considered
when developing systems and protocols to protect
privacy, it is time to analyze those that are breaking
ground in this area to move toward an understanding
of a possible data privacy triad.

3. Background
A. The ULD Star

Figure 1 – The ULD six-pointed star
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The ULD is a European government organization
that specializes in privacy. Since the European Union
is at the bleeding edge of privacy protections with
their recent General Data Protection Regulation, it is
reasonable to use a framework from a German data
protection authority as a representative framework for
many international communities. The three axes of the
Six-Pointed Star include Confidentiality versus
Availability, Integrity versus Intervenability, and
Transparency versus Unlinkability [43].
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability are taken
directly from the CIA security triad. The inclusion of
the security triad objectives within the privacy structure
highlights that, while security is an important
component of privacy, it should be considered a subset
of privacy. The additional aspects of privacy included
by ULD are Intervenability, Transparency, and
Unlinkability, which are defined by the ULD in the
same publication.
Unlinkability is “the property that privacy-relevant
data cannot be linked across domains that are
constituted by a common purpose and context” [43]. If
unlinkability is a priority, it should be nigh-impossible
to link any information gathered to any information
outside of the privacy system’s domain. The ULD
claims that “the most effective method for unlinkability
is data avoidance” [43]. One should only collect,
process, and store data when absolutely necessary.
Transparency is “the property that all privacyrelevant data processing… can be understood and
reconstructed at any time” [43]. Anything a data
processing system does regarding the collection,
processing, storage, or future planned processing
should be understood and reproducible by those using
the system and those running the system.
Intervenability is “the property that intervention is
possible concerning all ongoing or planned privacyrelevant data processing” [43]. Specifically, the report
states, the data subjects themselves should be able to
intervene with regards to the processing of their own
data. This, according to the ULD, is a way of ensuring
that data subjects have the ability to control how their
data is processed and by whom.

B. The NIST Triad
The NIST privacy objectives, as defined in NISTIR
8062: An Introduction to Privacy Engineering and Risk
Management in Federal Systems, is an effort to provide
“more guidance on privacy engineering processes,
including the assessment of privacy risk” [2] and
supplement the FIPPs (Fair Information Practice
Principles) defined in US government’s Circular A-130
document [44]. The document lists a set of three

privacy objectives meant to be data privacy’s version of
the CIA triad. These objectives are predictability,
manageability, and disassociability.

Figure 2 – The NISTIR 8062 privacy objectives
Predictability is defined as “enabling reliable
assumptions by individuals, owners, and operators
about PII (Personally Identifiable Information) and its
processing by an information system” [2]. This
objective, according to NIST, helps to ensure the FIPPs
of Accountability, Authority, Purpose Specification and
Use Limitation, and Transparency. To summarize the
definition, predictability is the notion that those
interacting with the system (whether they be operating
or using it) has the ability to make reasonable
assumptions about how the system handles PII. While
this objective does encourage transparency, it does not
require complete transparency. It simply aims to ensure
that anyone using the system is not surprised by how it
handles data.
Manageability is defined as “providing the capability
for granular administration of PII including alteration,
deletion, and selective disclosure” [2]. The FIPPs of
Accountability, Minimization, Quality and Integrity,
and Individual Participation are supported by
Manageability, according to NIST. By way of
manageability, those who process PII are able to ensure
the accuracy of data and the prompt removal of
obsolete information, while also ensuring that only
necessary information is collected and disclosed.
Manageability does not, however, state that all
individuals should have “the right to control their
information, although it could enable a system
capability to implement that policy” [2]. This
distinction is made because some systems handle
information about data subjects that the subjects should
not be allowed to change, such as tax information
handled by the IRS.
Disassociability is defined as “enabling the
processing of PII or events without association to
individuals or devices beyond the operation
requirements of the system” [2]. This objective helps to
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supplement
two
FIPPs:
Accountability
and
Minimization, according to NIST. In essence, this
objective aims to ensure that systems protect data
subjects from the unnecessary exposure of PII: data
should be disassociated from the subjects the data
comes from whenever possible. NIST does not,
however, claim that disassociability and anonymity are
equivalent. Namely, NIST states that “agencies may opt
to knowingly accept the risk [of exposure], or select
controls that require an acceptance of greater residual
risk…” Unlike confidentiality, which is focused on
preventing unauthorized access to information,
disassociability recognizes that privacy risks can result
from exposures even within an authorized perimeter.

4. Analysis
A cursory inspection of the two frameworks shows a
clear connection: namely, predictability is mappable to
transparency,
unlinkability
is
mappable
to
dissasociability, and manageability is mappable to
intervenability. Predictability and transparency both
stipulate that the system be understandable and
predictable from an outsider’s perspective.
Unlinkability and dissasociability both require that
any information used and stored be unconnectable to
outside information, and both frameworks state that the
best method to ensure their respective principle is to
minimize the data collected. Manageability and
intervenability both state that data should be correctable
by the proper parties. However, a more thorough
examination reveals critical differences between the
two.

A. Predictability versus Transparency

Figure 3 – Visual representation of transparent
systems as a subset of predictable systems
With regards to predictability and transparency, the
degree to which a system should be understood from an
outside
perspective
is
drastically
different.
Predictability is met if “reliable assumptions” can be

made about the system in question [2]. This does not
implicitly mean that data subjects and stakeholders
know how the data is being used, but rather that
subjects and stakeholders are not surprised by the way
data is used. Transparency, on the other hand, requires
that any data processing system should be
understandable and reconstructable at any given time
[43].
To put it another way, predictable systems are black
boxes: if one puts information in, the outcome of that
data entry is predictable by data subjects and
shareholders alike. Transparent systems are essentially
white boxes: while the ULD make no specific mention
to a complete understanding of the system’s technical
details, the fact that all transparent systems must be
reproducible implies a degree of system visibility far
exceeding the requirements of predictable systems.
Following this comparison, one could state that
transparent systems are a subset of predictable systems.
Additionally, transparency requires that a multitude
of contexts regarding the system in question be
understandable and reconstructable, “including the
legal, technical, and organization setting” [43].
Predictability makes no such mention of the context in
which the system is used. Once again, this lends
credence to the idea that predictable systems are a
subset of transparent systems. While the technical
capabilities of the system must be made apparent to
users in a predictable system, the context in which the
system is used need not be made apparent.
As an example, say a company collected, stored, and
processed PII. This company states that the system they
use gathers user-submitted data, stores it in on-site
servers, and then uses that information to better tailor
the services they provide to the individual user. What
they do not mention is that they tailor their services by
sharing this information to a politically affiliated
association which then uses that information to target
users with political advertisements. This system would
be a predictable one, but not a transparent one.
It is technically true that the information is used to
tailor the services the company provides to the
individual user, and it does so is an unsurprising way.
However, a transparent system would be required to
state how the information is used specifically as part of
its privacy notice: In this case, not disclosing that
personal data would be used for targeted advertising is
a privacy-relevant detail in the organizational setting
context. Since it wasn’t disclosed beforehand (and
hence the data processing wasn’t understood “at any
time” as per ULD), it is a violation of the transparency
protection goal.
When it comes to implementing one of these two
objectives into a data processing system, both have
their pros and cons. As may be obvious, transparency is
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stricter than predictability, and it is therefore more
costly to implement in terms of energy, time, and
money. However, one could see the choice as the
difference between a system that your customers can
trust and a system that your customers can understand.
In many ways, this makes transparency the superior
choice to predictability, as it can help sow good will
that may or may not be available in a predictable
system.
The managerial implications of these two objectives
also highlight a key difference between the
philosophies that motivated the development of these
two partial ontologies. NISTIR 8062 is a government
document meant to provide “future guidance on how
federal agencies will be able to incorporate privacy as
an attribute of trustworthy systems through the
management of privacy as a collaborative,
interdisciplinary engineering practice” [2]. By
comparison,
“Protection
Goals
for
Privacy
Engineering” states “The intention of this paper is to
give an overview and some pointers to ongoing
research in this area” [43]. It is, then, only natural for
the NIST objective to choose a more cost-effective
solution, while the ULD pushed the idea of
predictability and similar concepts to their logical
conclusions.

B. Manageability versus Intervenability

To better visualize this comparison, consider a data
broker. A data broker embracing intervenability would
allow for complete modification and deletion of the
data belonging to a data subject. If this data broker,
alternatively, embraced manageability, the system
could then be developed such that only internal staff
could granularly perform administrative actions on the
data.
If the system implements a way to modify data
(given proper authorization), then the system would
still “[provide] the capability for granular
administration of PII including alteration, deletion, and
selective disclosure” [2] thereby meeting the goal of
manageability. Full intervenability requires that any
subject whose data is stored in the system be able to
modify that data, while manageability only requires
that some qualified authority be able to do so.
When choosing between manageability and
intervenability, one should first consider the nature of
the data being processed and the way in which that data
is used. If the data are going to change rapidly then
consider intervenability. Should the data instead be
relatively stable or if the data are highly sensitive and
changes to the datum could result in drastic changes to
how that datum is handled, consider manageability.
Ultimately, one should consider how the data are likely
to change over the course of its use and who should be
able to correct and remove said data.

C. Disassociability versus Unlinkability

Figure 4 – Visual representation of
intervenable systems as a subset of
manageable systems
With regards to manageability and intervenability,
once again it appears that the ULD framework is more
restrictive than the NIST framework. Intervenability
requires that data subjects be able to intervene during
data processing and ensure that they are able to correct
and erase data, withdraw consent to data collection and
processing, and lodge claims and raise disputes to
remedy wrongful uses of data [43]. By contrast, NIST
explicitly states that “manageability is not a policy
statement about whether individuals should have the
right to control their information” [2].

Figure 5 – Visual representation of
disassociability and unlinkability
The differences between dissasociability and
unlinkability are more subtle than in the other two
comparisons. That is to say, there are very few actual
differences between the two privacy goals. The two
goals attempt to, in the words of NIST, “actively
[protect] or [“blind”] an individual’s identity or
associated activities from exposure” [2] and require
that system developers carefully consider the potential
damages that could occur as a result of data exposure.
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The confusing aspect of this, however, is the way in
which the ULD defines unlinkability. In accordance
with its name, unlinkability “is defined as the property
that privacy-relevant data cannot be linked across
domains that are constituted by a common purpose and
context” [43]. This definition requires a careful
consideration of what data is used and how that data is
stored with the end goal of a data set that is unlinkable
to domains and contexts outside of the current domain.
The keyword, for this comparison, is domain. One
could make the argument that the use of this word
implies that the data used should be linkable to similar
domains outside of the data system itself. However, this
contradicts the ULD’s statement saying that their
definition of unlinkability encompasses the concepts of
data minimization and anonymity. Assuming that any
interpretation of a definition that contradicts that
definition is invalid, this means that unlinkability
would not allow this linkability.
Thus, the major difference between the two
definitions, the use of the term domain, is negligible.
This implies that the two have goals so similar that they
are practically indistinguishable from each other.
Further analysis of these two privacy goals may reveal
some subtle differences beyond the scope of this
discussion, but for the purposes of this discussion, the
two are the same concept said with slightly different
words.

D. Holistic Comparisons
When taken as a whole, both frameworks call for
some degree of security, anonymity, transparency, and
data controllability. Both frameworks bring attention to
the importance of the CIA triad, with NIST stating that
the triad is the set of objectives by which systems meet
the FIPP of Security and the ULD incorporating
confidentiality, integrity, and availability into the SixPointed Star. Although they differ in subtle ways, each
of the objectives have similar goals when compared to
their counterpart in the other framework, as elaborated
on at the start of section III.
The two frameworks also differ in structure. While
the NIST framework’s objectives are intended to be the
CIA triad of privacy, the ULD triad is more than a
triad. The Six-Pointed Star that transparency,
unlinkability, and intervenability come from is a set of
axes showing what a system prioritizes.
Given the relationships between the two goals, it is
safe to say that the ULD triad focuses on defining the
highest possible standards to which data processors
must be held, while NIST’s triad focuses more on the
practical implementation of data privacy safeguards.
Put another way, one could say that the three
objectives of the NIST triad are goals that are capable

of defining how well a system supports the privacy
policies of an organization while the Six-Pointed Star
assumes that some kind of balance between security,
privacy, and goals within security and privacy will
always be reached by data systems and provides a way
of visualizing and measuring the tradeoffs made during
the system’s development.

5. Conclusions
Privacy is a complex topic that is enjoying more and
more research and development in recent years. As part
of this research, frameworks that are useful in
analyzing information system privacy goals and
objectives are a natural development. By comparing
these frameworks, subtle differences related to the
extent to which each part of the framework accurately
measures privacy and the components of privacy each
framework part attempts to address emerge. In this
comparison, it is clear that the intent behind the
framework influences its design.
As the preceding analysis shows, the Six-Pointed
Star developed by the ULD has much stricter
requirements regarding what must be done to safeguard
the privacy of data subjects. Both transparency and
intervenability define systems that form a proper subset
of systems within systems defined by their NIST
counterparts: predictability and manageability. By
comparison, NIST-defined systems are generally easier
to implement: the cost of turning a predictable system
into a transparent one tends to be non-trivial, for
example.
Given the two different goals found in the holistic
comparisons between the two, it is difficult to say
which is objectively superior as each framework has a
set of goals that are not directly compatible with each
other. While many ideas are represented in both
frameworks, the differences in practicality, usability,
strictness, and intent make the two too distinct to
directly compare their quality. Neither framework,
then, is inherently superior to the other in all scenarios.
However, the framework proposed by the ULD
would make a stronger starting point for the definition
of data privacy because of its focus on defining the
highest possible standards that data processing
organizations must follow. A universal definition for
data privacy must be as all-encompassing as is possible,
and the practical implementation focus of NIST’s
framework, while important for the implementation of
data privacy, was found to be less restrictive
comparatively. However, the ULD standard is
incomplete because it does not take into account
compromises which are necessary if the definition is to
be used in the future. That is to say, while the ULD
standard is a better basis for a future definition, it must
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be expanded to include the considerations included in
the NIST framework.
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6. Recommendations and Future Work
Given that the Six-Pointed Star is the stronger
starting point for a universal definition of data privacy,
future work expanding on this comparison should
center around enhancing the ULD framework to
mitigate its weaknesses with regards to the
implementation of its objectives.
The two triads used in this analysis are not
universally accepted as definitive and comprehensive
definitions of data privacy, as evidenced by the
numerous other frameworks that have been developed.
In future research, comparisons between the
frameworks used in this analysis and other data privacy
frameworks and any potential triads such as the EU’s
GDPR, APEC’s Privacy Framework, and Google’s
Framework for Responsible Data Protection [45]; [46];
[47] should be performed. Additionally, this research
will help to pave the way for a universal definition of
data privacy and an accepted set of principle
components of data privacy.
Given the fact that these frameworks were defined by
different countries, future research should also be
performed to determine the differing notions, goals, and
intentions that lead to the development of data privacy
frameworks in different countries and cultures.
Building on this idea, any research into currently
enacted privacy laws or regulations would be
invaluable towards reaching a common data privacy
triad.
Finally, as this comparison is relatively shallow with
regards to the full reports that define these privacy
triads, a deeper dive into the way in which these
privacy triads are to be implemented or an exhaustive
comparison and analysis between the two frameworks
as a whole would be useful for future discussions.
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